One of Britain's most realistic writers, G. Orwell, said on one occasion "In the case of a word like democracy not only is there no agreed definition, but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides..."¹ Nevertheless, if defining democracy merely signifies giving the meaning of the word, the problem is quickly solved, for all that is required is some knowledge of Greek. Literally democracy means "power of the people", that the power belongs to the people. However, we also have to ask what the term stands for. In 1949 a UNESCO inquiry into ideological conflicts concerning democracy issued the following statement: "For the first time in the history of the world, no-doctrines are advanced as anti-democratic. Practical politicians and political theorist agree in stressing the democratic element in the institutions they defend and the theories they advocate. This acceptance of democracy as the highest form of political or social organization is the sign of a basic agreement in the ultimate aims of modern social and political institutions."² Yet the term continues to preoccupy political scientists and political philosophers. The reason lies most probably in the undeniable fact, that the major components of democracy such as equality, self government, sovereignty, representation, majority rule encompass according to the prevailing "Zeitgeist"a different meaning. This is particularly true in the case of leadership and elites, because as H.D. Lasswell remarked "Governent is always

* This paper was presented at the London School of Economics on February 2, 1982 as Special University Lecture.
government by the few ... But this fact does not settle the question of the degree of democracy. To confuse the percentage of leaders with the degree of democracy is to make an elementary mistake, since a society may be democratic and express itself through a small leadership. The key question turns on accountability!"3

These few remarks are an attempt to explain partly why political scientists in the recent past have been particularly keen not to dwell too much on the philosophical meaning of the democratic regime in a given society, but have rather attempted to develop some typologies of democratic systems. The overriding concerns of scholars investigating democratic systems have been the quality and the stability of democracy. Thus political scientists, such as Neumann and G. Sartori argue that compared with multiparty systems, two-party systems are said to be more "democratic" and more stable. G. Almond on the other side deals more with the concept of political culture and argues that fragmented cultures and mutual dependence of parties and groups result in stagnation which seems to have unfavourable consequences for the survival of the democracy. This leads to Lipjhart's distinction between centrifugal, consociational and centripetal democracies. It would no doubt be feasible to continue to scrutinize the major ideals of political scientists of the past decade. At this point it is enough to say, that the evaluation of each model will greatly depend upon the degree of interest articulation, the organization of social groups and political parties, intensity of patronage/client relationship, fragmentation or unity within the respective political culture and finally the role civil and military bureaucracies are assuming in acting on behalf of the leadership.

A similar brief assessment of the rather vague concept of "modernization" seems equally important. The syndrome of political modernization as suggested by Lucian Pye and others includes: 1) A general inclination towards equality which allows participation in politics and competition for government office; 2) the capacity of a political system to formulate policies and to have them carried out; 3) differentiation and specialisation

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of political functions, though not at the expense of their overall integration and 4) the secularisation of the political process, to separation of politics from religious aims and influence.4

Given the existence of these developmental problems arising from political modernisation, political development is then often seen as a political system's capacity to solve these problems. Thus using C. Dodd's definition we may say, that the concepts of political modernisation and political development embrace one or more of the following notions:

1 - Political change necessary for the achievements of a specific objective like liberal democracy, constitutional monarchy,

2 - A general process of change in the political system which is seen to comprise: a) the expansion and centralisation and the differentiation and specialisation of political functions and structure,

3 - Increased popular participation in politics,

4 - A political system's capacity to solve problems,

5 - The ability to learn better and better how to perform political functions.5

Using these two basic concepts namely democracy and modernisation I would like to attempt to evaluate Turkey's performance over the last two centuries. The major question to be answered each time it is to what extent Turkish society has changed its structure while approaching the universal values of democracy.

Since it is obvious that no democratic system can achieve overnight autonomy and a full re-organisation of society, it seems appropriate to analyze our topic within four major phases:

I - A belated Magna Carta - Modernization of the Ottoman Empire (1808-1908)

II - Prologomena to democracy: State founding and nation building (1908-1946)

III — Transition to a multiparty system: mobilizing the periphery (1946-1960)

IV — Turkey's transformation into a pluralistic society: democracy on trial (1960-1980).

I — What happened in the XIX century? Why do I start with 1808? Due to the continuous wars during the XVIII century, the empire was considerably weakened. Progressive minded Sultan Selim III starting the so-called “defensive modernization”, introduced into the Ottoman educational system European language and military manuals. Although he was quickly dethroned and killed, this attempt nevertheless succeeded in breaking down the Ottoman “Iron Curtain”. At this point the āyan's, lords of the valleys, equipped with armies of their own and the Janissaries as well as the Ulema, forced the Sultan to sign a ‘Document of Agreement” (Sened-i İttifak) in 1808, in which central government and provincial magnates pledged mutual respect for their vested rights. That document signaled a victory for the power of local notables. Again it might have laid like the Magna Carta had done, a foundation for limited and representative government. Yet, in two decades Sultan Mahmud II, managed to erode that foundation, abolishing the Janissaries in 1826 and creating a cadre of westernized bureaucrats and military officers, unchallenged by any institutional checks or balance. These developments were strongly supported by Great Britain, the champion of free market economy and colonialism.

Indeed, in this period, external dependency of the Ottoman Empire had increased noticeably. The year after the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Commerce in 1838, the Tanzimat Edict of 1839 was promulgated. The purpose of these reforms was to meet the demands of the propertied classes for legal protection; in meant former equality for all citizens, codification of penal and commercial laws. More significantly, the Sultan was to reorganize his bureaucracy in compliance with the imperatives of an “ind-pendent” and “rational” society. The Ottoman bureaucrats were to be transformed from the “slaves” of the Sultan to “servants of society”.

However one has to be careful in attributing too much importance to the first generation of Ottoman bureaucrats. In
reality, the Men of the Tanzimat were far more distant from the mass of the people than the older Ottoman rulers ever were. They wanted to achieve deep rooted reforms, but were themselves deeply committed to the Ottoman values. Secondly, the social structure of the empire was highly elitist. Thirdly, at this point the Ottoman society was still very far from goals such as national identification and efficiency. This explains why the central bureaucracy could not transform a society and why most of the reform schemes such as Ottomanism as a counter ideology to nationalism, reforms in provincial administration, an Ottoman Constitution - floundered.6

Nevertheless, certain administrative moves prepared the ground for democratic values. Thus, after 1860 the organization of provincial government was reshuffled and the principle of representation was incorporated in three separate institutions set up by law: the administrative councils of the provinces, the local courts and a general assembly for each province. Although the two statesmen who prepared this law wanted to secure better government and not a preface to a chamber of deputies, the electoral law that accompanied the Constitution of 1876 was based squarely on the indirect electoral system of the provincial law.

Even so, both representation in the provinces and the promulgation of a constitution in the capital were doomed in advance to failure. The major reason was the conviction of the Ottoman reformers that all innovation had to come from the top. Even the young Ottomans who were committed to big changes strongly insisted that the empire must continue to rest on Islam. The failure of the Ottoman Constitution reflected the inadequacies of the reforms, the lack of agreement among the bureaucrats and their limited understanding of how and why constitutions worked in the West.7

7 Heper, Metin, "Center and periphery in the Ottoman empire with special reference to the 19th century", International Political Science Review, 1: 81-105.
This sharp clash between the desire to create a "civic society" and the unwillingness of the throne to accept any societal demands, led both to an undermining of the governmental bureaucracy as well as illegal activities abroad. During the Tanzimat period, there developed for the first time an intensive conflict between alternative programs of modernization. A very small circle consisting of younger military officers, some low ranking ulema and an exiled Egyptian prince formed the New Ottoman Society in about 1860. This group consisted of dissidents within the ruling elite. At the beginning they could exercise great influence. Elections to the first Ottoman House of Representatives in 1877 were hastily improvised, without an election law, without a lengthy campaign and without party organization. The Sultan, reluctant to give up his divine right within a year, re-established an autocratic system by adjourning the House for 33 years. This meant the end of the "New Ottomans". But the wheel of history continued to turn. A handful of students of the military Medical School, secretly founded in 1899 the Society of Ottoman Union (Osmanlı İttihat Cemiyeti).8

Inspired by the Italian revolutionary Carbonari organization, this association continued to recruit members in other schools of Istanbul. Parallel to these secret activities journalists, civil servants and intellectuals such as Ahmed Rıza fled abroad and started to publish newspapers in Paris, Geneva, London and Caire. In Europe, called "The Young Turks", this group anxious to secure also the support of Non-Moslems, changed the name of their organization into "Union and Progress". Enlarging their external activities, they managed to establish a branch in Cairo in 1899. The members of this secret society held two congresses in 1902 and 1907 in Paris. The first congress resulted in a split between a centralist and a federalist faction. The Turks were mainly drawn to the centralist faction, while the federalists appealed strongly to non-Turkish elements. Due to the strong preoccupation of the Young Turks with incorporating the concepts of constitutionalism and representation into

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8 Toziç, Erdoğan, Siyasi Partiler, 100 soruda serisi, Gerçek Yayınevi, 1976, P. 177-178.
the Ottoman empire, currents of thought dealing with socialism, communism and anarchy, totally escaped their attention.\(^9\)

Parallel to these resistance movements abroad, within the Empire progressive-minded army officers, among them young Mustafa Kemal, founded in 1906 in Salonika another secret society, the Ottoman Freedom Society.

Repeated interventions by the Big Powers for administrative changes in Macedonia, induced the external groups to unite. Thus the second congress of 1907 resulted in the unification of the major groups, namely the Ottoman Society for Union and Progress led by Ahmed Rıza and the Liberal Society for Individual Enterprise and Decentralization under Prince Sabahaddin.\(^10\)

How did they come to power? In 1908 Great Britain continued to exercise pressure on the Macedonian issue. The verbalisation that this province might become autonomous, thus rendering Istanbul vulnerable, caused serious concern both at the headquarters of the Union and Progress in Paris and among the army in Macedonia. Highly critical of the Sultan's policies, some 200 soldiers and officers and another 200 civilian under the leadership of Major Niyazi bey, decided on July 3rd to retreat to the mountains and start a guerilla war. They issued a declaration asking for the restoration of constitutional monarchy. On July 20th, a petition signed by 180 citizens of Kosova, demanded the convening of a "people's assembly". As a result the return to the Constitution of 1876 was announced on July 23 in Manastır by army officers on behalf of the Union and Progress. The Sultan, realizing that the turn of events could not be stopped, acquiesced in the demands and announced on July 24th the return to the Constitution.\(^11\) Historical records show us that Abdülhamit's despotic rule was brought to an end by army officers, who were secret

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UP members. The headquarters of the UP in Paris learned of the events after some delay and of course approved of them. Thus it becomes evident that it was an autochtone, predominantly military secret organization, the Ottoman Freedom Society, which actually re-opened the way to democracy. For students of Turkish history, 1908 represents a major turning point. Five hundred years of oriental despotism comes to an end, once and for all.

What happened after the restoration of the Constitution? Neither the army officers nor the members of the Union and Progress Committee participated immediately in government. Only after a reactionary revolution, demanding the return to the Sheriat, which took place on March 31, 1909, did the army intervene. Mahmud Şevket pasha, who restored order at this point, tried to stop young officers from joining the Committee and thus participating in politics. Thus political responsibility was placed in the hands of the members of a former conspiratory group who without any political experience, had power over a huge empire. The concept of political party was so alien to these novice leaders, that the Society for Union and Progress decided only in 1913 to organize itself around political aims.

Looking back on the Young Turks, the important feature of this group appears as follows: they were nationalists, conspirators and revolutionaries. Actually they only wanted to curb the Sultan's despotism. They did not set out to overthrow the bureaucratic élite because they were junior members of that élite. They were variously liberal, positivist, religious, but their enmities were based in group loyalty. The political parties which came into existence were formed from within the élite groups in the system. The political system, which emerged during the first opening toward more liberty, was unable to accept democratic values. For all its initial liberalism, the "young Turk" régime became authoritarian and rather more severe in its treatment of its enemies than Abdülhamit's government. Its achievement can be described merely as an opening for movement between élite groups.12

II — What happened during the second phase? This period witnesses the dismantling of a 500-year old empire, the building of a nation, the founding of a new state in the form of a secular republic in which the ultimate power remains in the hands of the people. This stupendous “tour de force” which resulted, as Lord Kinross expressed it so eloquently in “the rebirth of the sphinx from his ashes”, introduced in Turkey’s public life an amazing array of new ideas and organization, while retaining a great deal of its structure. Indeed the Turkish Republic was not forged by powerful social groups nor did it ride a massive wave of popular discontent. The political dominance of the bureaucrats was kept intact and the pre-revolutionary distribution of power remained more or less the same. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the fierce War of Independence, the collaboration of the Sultan/Caliph with the foreign occupying forces lead in an astonishingly speedy way to a total dissolution of all institutions belonging to the past.

The ongoing ideological controversy during the decline of the empire between Islamism, Nationalism and Turanism was brought to a stop by Mustafa Kemal for whom the ultimate goal was to preserve and develop the Turkish nation. This goal was also to be the legitimizing force for all political innovations. In his understanding of nation, the notions of public interest and justice were located in the concept of “general will”. Thus national interest was conceived as an entity. This is why after Mustafa Kemal had been elected as the chairman of the Association for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia in Sivas in 1919, he succeeded in convening the first parliament of the yet not declared Turkish Republic as early as April 20, 1920 in Ankara. The Constitution of 1921, which created the legal basis for an assembly-government adopting the unification of powers, asserted that sovereignty belonged unconditionally to the nation. The indivisibility of the nation was reasserted at each occasion. Thus next to the personalization of power through the charismatic personality of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, an abstract concept of de-personalized power took firm root.\textsuperscript{13} And Mustafa Kemal, in one of the most significant spee-

ches of his career intimated his own view of his Society for the Defense of Rights as a link between elitist past and populist future:

“If a nation does not become concerned about its existence and its rights with its entire strength, it cannot be rescued from becoming this person’s or that person’s puppet. Therefore within our organisation the principle has been adopted that the national forces are supreme and that the national will is paramount.”

“If we now look at the other details of the organization - we begin our work from the village, from the individual. A structure that in this way rises from below to the top, from the foundation to the roof, will surely be sturdy. Nonetheless, there is a need at the beginning of any undertaking to go not from below upward, but from above downward.”

These words are of the many proofs that Kemalism was the first movement that tried to transcend the limitations of earlier modernization efforts. It proclaimed the ideals of popular sovereignty and civic participation by means of science, not religion, as the guide to social action. Nevertheless, even this commitment still rests upon the metaphor of the Tuba ağacı- “a tree which supposedly had its roots in heaven, but which lent its delightful shade and its fruits to mankind.”

How was this move toward a reshaping of the social structure translated into political action? Mustafa Kemal followed a logical sequence of political strategies: first concerted military action for the achievement of independence (1919-1922), followed by bold decisions in the direction of establishing a new state on a republican basis, meaning on the will of the people. The third stage represents a series of legal and cultural reform aiming at adopting as many Western institutions and codes as feasible (1926-1933). The final phase, while economically devoted to the implementation of state sponsored industrialisation, politically witnessed both reorganization of the ruling party as well as the attempt to achieve the transition to a competitive system.

Looking at the particular circumstances, which caused the emergence of the People’s Republican Party, founded in 1924, we see that all its members belonged to the First Group of the
Grand National Assembly, who we may qualify as liberal modernizers versus the Second Group, representing the conservative opposition. At this early stage and even later the single party of Atatürk had two integrative effects: it was the primary agency for providing the necessary governmental coordination at the highest level, and it was the basic institution mediating between government and the extra-govermental systems in the society.\textsuperscript{14} Kemalism embracing six principles such as republicanism, secularism, étatism, populism, nationalism, revolution definitely carries an ideological flavour. But this ideology represented rather pragmatic values embedded in one common framework. This explains why no extravagant need relying on a supremacy of race, culture or state was developed. There was no party militia or party cell organization. The party was centralized, at one period it attempted to unite the administrative structure with the party structure, yet its major vehicle was a cultural one, the People's Houses.\textsuperscript{15}

Atatürk, keen to bring his country up to Western standards, constantly tried to introduce a competitive element into Turkish politics. The first trial of Turkish opposition occurred in November 1924, when the anti-Kemalist members of the First Assembly, who wanted to bring back a constitutional monarchy, formed the Progressive Party with 29 deputies. They were representing a dissenting group of Atatürk's closest collaborators. As long as the debate remained in parliament things went on as normal. But the party began to establish its organization in the provinces; this coincided with a sedious rebellion in the East and an attempt on Mustafa Kemal's life in İzmir. The first experiment came to an abrupt end.

The longing however did not come to an end. In 1930 Atatürk had an interview with the German journalist Emil Ludwig stating that “Government is not built on fear. If it relies on cannons, it will not last. Such governing which is really dictatorship, is necessary for a temporary period during

\textsuperscript{14} Mustafa Kemal, \textit{Nutuk III}, P. 259; \textit{Söylev III}, P. 11.

a time of rebellion." Atatürk never developed an ideology justifying authoritarianism and dictatorship. His main concern revolved around two themes: replacing irrational traditional, religious thinking with scientific knowledge and logic and achieving a peaceful competitive system. This explains why in 1930 Atatürk decided that parliament had to be given new life. Two reasons played a decisive role: the undemocratic image Turkey was projecting in Western Europe and the economic difficulties which emerged from Turkey's étatist policy. This led to a sort of an understanding between Fethi Okyar and Atatürk that an opposition party which would furnish constructive alternatives would be welcomed. Atatürk in a formal letter promised that "... during my term of office I will perform my duties as President impartially vis-a-vis the party which is in power and the party which is in opposition." The Free Party which had only 14 members in parliament was not very active in the debates, but it created an unexpected uproar in the provinces especially in the Aegean region. The conviction among the RPP leaders that religious and social reactionaries were about to wreck the reforms induced the leader of the Free party to dissolve his organization. The experiment had lasted 99 days.

But inspite of these two unsuccessful experiments, Atatürk did not give up the idea of opening the gates for a wider dialogue. In March 1931, the nomination of candidates was altered and in April 1931, 1,176 nominees were proposed for 287 seats. After Atatürk's death in 1938, the RPP created in 1939 a 21-member Independent Group, to act as opposition. The purpose was to conceive a device for accustoming people to the working of a multi-party system.

What did this stage contribute? No doubt the charismatic leadership of Atatürk performed a unique function in nation-building, creating unity and self-confidence for national development without any external support. Furthermore it extended through indirect electoral procedure the notion of political participation. Its most important tangible successes were the

16 Mustafa Kemal, Söylev ve Demeçler, P. 87; Declaration given to the "Vossische Zeitung".
major transformation of the educational system, from a religious to secular one, the increase in literacy through the adoption of a new alphabet and the education of the masses through the People's Houses.

If democracy consists of enlarging the circle of political actors this phase represents the internalization of political representation as the ultimate essence of the political system. As M. Duverger remarks "the apologia of authority was replaced in Kemalist Turkey by an apologia for democracy, not for a "popular" or a "social" but for a traditional political democracy and he continues "the single Turkish party had a bad conscience." Mustafa Kemal recognizing the greater value of pluralism was striving for it, "this represents not only an evolution in Turkish history, but also projects a model for developing societies."

These uninterrupted efforts explain the constant drive at teaching the party elite to act as well as to think democratically and to broaden the new political culture so as to embrace the population as a whole. The framework of the single party was retained but within the party's structure, there was created a simulated model of pluralism at many levels.

III — Transition to a multiparty system: mobilizing the periphery (1946-1960)

Turkey's move from a single party system to competitive politics has been largely discussed. Rightly, because this decision did not come about because of internal, violent upheaval, external threat or military intervention. Atatürk's successor, İsmet İnönü, on May 19, 1946, in a public speech declared the political arena as open. Why? From a sociological point of view, the major reason can be found with the demands for economic freedom of the new business and commerce class, which emerged during World War II. Besides this, one has to include the resentment of many stratas of society who did not fully espouse the two most controversial Kemalist principles, namely secularism and étatism. But other reasons are also to be found:

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İnönü and his team after successfully maneuvering Turkey out of World War II were anxious to contribute to the establishment of the United Nations. A single party Turkey looked politically embarrassing. Finally there was the growth of an urban, educated, impatient intelligentsia thirsty for freedom which convinced that it could manage the rules of the game, wanted to practice democracy. Finally the urge for greater freedom was as intense outside parliament, as it was inside the incumbent party. After the historical decision to go to the polls, the fight for greater liberalization was carried on with determination by liberal groups within the RPP itself. President İnönü was among the most vigorous in insisting that multiparty politics should start. Under the continued pressure of the newly formed Democrats - who represented a dissenting group of the RPP opposing a land reform law project - and the liberal Republicans, numerous laws were passed improving the electoral laws, authorizing the formation of labour unions, amending the Law of Associations, etc.

The decade of 1950-1960 represents in Turkish recent history an unprecedented popular shift from a single party system to a multiparty system in which the Democrat Party emerged as an uncontested political force. The landslide victory occurred on May 14, 1950. The new government party began its existence with a considerable amount of support from political élites. Furthermore it had acquired a considerable amount of parliamentary experience during the previous four years. They were no novices on the political floor. More important, many groups found appeal in various aspects of the Democrat Party program, which stressed a lessening of étatism, but which remained in a similar direction. As C. Dodd eloquently stated "the economic policies of the People's Party and the Democrat Party differed in emphasis, but not in direction".¹⁹ Indeed it was more the tone, the style, the rhetorics which differed, thus using mass media as an influential political vehicle.

After assuming power in 1950, the Democrat Party immediately moved to consolidate its popularity among all groups of the population available to it. The most important of these

groups, the peasants, were courted on cultural, political and economic terms. Culturally the Democrat Party resorted to conciliatory gestures in terms funding mosque building, installing Koran-programs on the radio, etc. Politically the Democrat Party strengthened the power of local leaders by encouraging intervention of party bosses in dealings between citizens and the bureaucracy. Thus the electorate got the feeling of having a responsible government. The periphery had entered the inner circle in Turkish politics. As a number of lower class Turks entered political life, Turkey was for the first time in its history confronted by large scale rural elections - a kind of Green Revolution. The Democrats also benefitted from being the government through which a variety of groups produced what S. Sayar called “a real rural political machine”.20

The widespread support generated by these policies led to an even more decisive Democrat Party election victory in 1954. With 490 out of 535 Assembly seats in its hands, the Democrat Party found itself in a position of unchecked power. This led to a severely polarized political atmosphere. The tendency to with increasing inflation and shortage repressive measures were undertaken, including strengthened press censorship, laws which forced judges and university professors to retire, regulations making it more difficult for small parties to qualify to enter elections. By the time of the 1957 elections —one year a head of term— tensions were becoming severe.

These setbacks were in part responsible for the Democrat Party’s electoral decline in 1958, the voters having become attentive to economic issues as well as to social and cultural ones. The status of the armed forces, bureaucracy and intellectuals had been seriously lowered both politically and materially, leading to a return of many of these groups to the RPP and increasing their complaints about what was now being called “programmatic betrayal of Kemalism”. In late 1959 tensions increased even more sharply when the government began to arrest journalists and dissidents and to move toward direct repression of the RPP. After a number of violent clashes in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, the armed forces moved to over-

throw the Menderes regime on May 27, 1960. The coup was realized by relatively speaking low ranking, young officers; the office of the presidency was offered to one of the Atatürk loyal senior general Cemal Gürsel after the intervention was successfully completed.21

The military commanders ruled Turkey for the next 18 months only, keeping their promise to return the country to democratic politics as quickly as possible. There were several reasons for this. First, the armed forces since Atatürk's days had been schooled to keep military and political affairs separate. Second, there were disagreements within the army on goals and policies. Third, tactically the National Unity Committee had proclaimed clearly limited goals for restructuring certain institutions, such as the Constitution, the electoral law, political trials. Fourth, the country's democratic institutions quickly began to assert their continuing vitality. In response to considerable pressure from the remaining political parties, a Constituent Assembly was convened in January 1961. In July (9.7.1961) a national referandum was held and elections took place in October 1961, which inaugurated what some have termed “Turkey's Second Republic”.22 In the October election two third of the votes went to three parties (Justice, New Turkey, Republican Peasant's Nation Party), which were all but openly aspiring to become successors to the Democrat Party in their social and economic programmes. The immediate return of conservatives to power was prevented because these parties split the former DP votes and the RPP became the largest single party.

In looking back on the performance of this phase of moving into a multiparty system, it has to be stressed that the beginning of this transition brought more movement in the economic structure than in the social one. Liberalization of commerce, limitation of the economic role of the state, encouragement of foreign investment, generous extension of agricultural credit to the peasantry created the basis for a real economic take-off.

These measures were not backed by equivalent support mechanisms in the constitutional and governmental field. Fundamental rights were granted but without adequate judicial control, the electoral system smashing a viable opposition, the freedom of the press and mass media heavily subjugated to governmental control. The change in the Assembly's social composition eliminated most of the bureaucrats and replaced them with businessmen, large landowners, members of the liberal profession and especially local community leaders. The social climbers won over the “Honoratioren”. Thus the “Green Uprising” to use S. Huntington's terminology, opened the way for the development of an extended clientele system. This means that interest representation began to be more and more channeled through vertical ties. Thus the dependency ties between agrarian elite and peasants in the Ottoman rural society became revitalized through political modernization and this opened the way for a sharper polarization between the major political parties.

IV — Turkey's transformation into a pluralistic society: democracy on trial

Beginning with the 1960's Turkey entered a new in many respect unprepared phase briefly labelled as pluralistic democracy. The new constitution attempted to create a delicate balance between legislative and executive, strengthening the independent role of the judiciary and creating a number of autonomous public institutions. Assessing these new institutions together with the equally newly introduced proportional electoral system, no doubt their functioning depended largely on a tolerant attitude on the part of the governing bodies, a genuine adoption of the rules of the game on behalf of the ruled, and on a less emotional climate of opinion. The lack of most of these elements finally led to the breakdown of this fragile system. But before relating the impact of this last phase on political modernization, a short analysis of the socio-economic development of Turkish society at this point seems imperative.

After 1960, internal and external migration continued to

grow, urbanization acquired an unequalled speed. There emerged a large amount of un and under—employment, only alleviated by the new markets for excess man—power in Europe and the Middle East. In 1963 labour unions received the right to strike, thus converting industrial workers into a major interest group. The expansion of education as well as the growth of mass communication produced a noticeable rise in economic and social expectations. It also made it harder for traditional political leaders to maintain control.

An important struggle within the bureaucracy took place around the orientation of the successive Five Year Development Plans, which following a constitutional guideline, have to coordinate all sectors of public and private investment and development.

The most important change in this respect seems to be the efforts spent on institutionalizing Turkey’s various social groups and forces. During the last twenty years there has been hardly any section in Turkish society—except peasants and agricultural workers—which has not emerged in some kind of organization and became highly visible in pursuit of its interests. The trade unions, which recorded in 1977 a membership of 3.8 million not only fought hard for wage increases, but started a significant number of strikes. No doubt this radicalized type of interest articulation while certainly contributing to the growing awareness of class consciousness contributed to the heightening of social tension and the alienation of marginal groups from the political system, thus preparing the ground for violence and anarchy. While the veteran confederation Türk-İş continued to act as a non-party pressure group retaining its predominance in the public sector, a dissenting, radical group, which organized DİSK (Revolutionary Trade Unions Confederation) in 1967, managed to establish a leading place in the private sector, The attempt in 1978 of the government to negotiate with Türk-İş a “Social Contract”, outlining general guidelines for labour relations, failed to yield results in the following years. The sharp polarization and tension between the two labour confederations was without doubt one of the major reasons for the breakdown of political institutions in 1980.
Besides the labour organization, commercial and industrial interest groups on one side, artisans and craftsmen’s associations on the other side, have constantly increased their political influence and organization. Although Turkey’s private sector remains heterogenous with strong intra-sector jealousies, its political impact is overall present. The competition between Western oriented large scale industry/business and small industry and trade in Anatolia, has not come to an end, on the contrary with the support of some 4.000 artisans’ association, representing approximately half of Turkey’s 3 million artisans and small scale tradesmen (esnaf), it produced twice a conservative/fundamentalist party, which built up a considerable amount of social networks.

An equally relevant role was played within the private sector by a) the Turkish Confederation of Employers Associations, b) the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and c) the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association. The business and commercial groups which have come to the political stage since the 1950’s have substantially increased their political role and influence and established particularly close links with conservative governments. While the peasants did not enter this race for associational representation and farming lobbies, the process which started in the 1950’s in the form of a patron-client relationship lost, due to the rapid mechanisation of agriculture and the extension of cash cropping, its traditional aspect. Clientele transactions were operated on a increasingly larger scale through rural/urban political machines, whose representatives were the daily visitors at lunch of many M.P.’s. This might confirm Scott, who states that machine parties are not likely to flourish at a time of rapid socio-economic change when traditional vertical ties have weakened, but have not yet been replaced by new ideological or class ties.

Analyzing the evolution of pluralism in Turkey two additional social forces have to be cited: the military and religion. The tradition of a professional and politically unpartisan military is deeply embedded in Kemalism and has been continued since. However the inability of Turkish political institutions to control anarchy, rural and urban violence, forced the army to move publicly into the political arena. Because the military
possesses a greater capacity for generating order in a radical praetorian society, the task of "re-shaping" Turkey's democratic foundations had fallen twice upon the shoulder of the army within one decade.\textsuperscript{21} Already in March '71, a memorandum given by the four commanders of the armed forces asked for the resignation of the incumbent Prime Minister. This was followed by the imposition of martial law, but also by the continuance of civilian governments consisting of technocrats. Especially after having given political parties another chance following the elections of 1973 and 1977, the armed forces although expressing their ever present vigilance through frequent Security Councils preferred to urge the political parties to reconsider their full responsibility and to take the necessary measures.\textsuperscript{25} In 1980, it was not until guerilla violence between left and right extremists became so widespread that there was all but unanimous agreement among political as well as military observers, that the breakdown in law and order was unbearable. This time again, the army acted again to enable the re-functioning of Turkey's democratic institutions.

The second significant social and political force in Turkey, although not substantially institutionalized, is represented by religion. Nevertheless, whether Islam is a significant force in this country is highly debatable. Inspite of the unity between the Sultanate and the Caliphate, secular legislation was already in existence under the Ottomans. As early as in the XIX th century the concept that life can be lived in accordance with human rationality, defined by political scientists as the "normative secularization as desacralization" had taken some roots. Atatürk and his associates endeavored to free the polity from religious considerations. Atatürk's major aspiration was to encourage the spreading of a "scientific mentality" one of the major criteria for modernization. After the transition to a multiparty system, although religion was used increasingly


as an instrument in political participation, it did not result in a laissez-faire policy concerning Islam. As C. Dodd observes, "Turkey has always allowed Islam to use what means it can spread itself, provided that the Islamic institution is not recreated outside and apart from the State."26

Indeed it would be erroneous to conclude that the stupendous growth of imam hatip schools which amounted in 1950/51 to 7 with 876 students, reaching the number of 588 in 1979/80 with 178,013 students, is preparing for the foundation of a non-secular, fundamentalist Islamic state.27

Yet in one area of religion two important developments took place in Turkey after the 60's. Islam has acquired in recent years a more striking visibility in social life and became an obstentious vehicle for political organization. With fast urbanization and migration, the accentuation of social stratification created the need for some of community identification. Indeed various studies have indicated that the large number of religious-based local associations have as many community functions as ideological ones. Thus on the social level the most important dimension of the recent visibility of Islam in Turkey seems to be of a psychological and cultural nature.28

This observation permits one to differentiate this individual aspect of Islam from the societal/political one. Although religion gained in importance in the 50's, due to a number of conciliatory symbols, more significant developments took place after the 60's. With the adoption of the 1961 Constitution, the scope of public liberties was widened. The first religious political party to appear was the Turkish Unity Party, which indirectly aimed to receive the support of the Turkish Shiite population, the Alevis. Their share of the vote in 1969, 1973 and 1977 was 2.8, 1.1, 0.4 % respectively.

27 Abadan-Unat, N. and Yücekoğ, A.N., Religious Pluralism in Turkey: The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1969-70. P.
The major religiously-oriented political party during the 70's was the National Salvation Party. It gathered 11.9 and 8.6% of the votes in the 1973 and 1977 elections. This party, Sunni in orientation, attempted a synthesis of Islam and economic growth exemplified by national capitalism. In spite of the open anti-secularism of the NSP, its major impact on the masses was its articulated opposition to Turkey's planned entry into the Common Market and integration with Europe.

Furthermore polarization among adherents of the two major sects, Sunni and Alevites, was a major instrument of anti-system, subversive groups, attempting to undermine national unitly by manipulating group cohesiveness. To sum up, although Turkish society did relatively successfully internalize secularization, religion as an ideology has acquired a new dimension in recent years.

Finally special attention has to be devoted to the major vehicle of political modernization, the political party system and its actors, the legislators. Although over the last 20 years, as in previous elections, the great majority of the votes were concentrated in two parties, the J.P. and the RPP, nevertheless there has been a noticeable amount of instability due to the use of proportional representation leading to the necessity of forming coalition governments. Of the two major parties, the RPP, has been in office three times since 1961, but never alone. The first time, just after the revolution of May 27 1960, it was a kind of forced alliance with the Justice Party. The second time the PRP entered into office with the NSP, but this lasted less than one year. The last attempt was in 1978/79 when the PRP formed a strange coalition with eleven formed J.P. members, who called themselves "independent". On the other side, the Justice Party was able to govern by itself over one full legislative period (1965-1969) but later was also obliged to enter into coalitions, labelled as "National Front" governments. In these coalition governments formed in 1975, 1977, 1979, two smaller parties drawing assistance from national sentiment and from fear and hatred of Russia played decisive roles.29

The incoherent nature of both right and left of the center coalition governments led to serious undesirable consequences. There were important differences of opinion on foreign policy issues such as Cyprus and the EEC. Coalition members were overly suspicious of each other. Each ministry was brought under the complete jurisdiction of an individual political party and rendered autonomous from every other ministry. Issues were treated solely from a partisan viewpoint. Coalition members were each heavily engaged in unrestrained patronage. Coalition members often disregarded laws and regulations. The legitimacy of the decisions of the Council of State and those of the Constitutional Court were repeatedly questioned. The political stagnation which resulted from these serious controversies among other results, increased the antipathy toward the intellectual bureaucratic elite, thus undermining the efficiency of any governmental action.

The disintegration of governmental authority and the openly exercised criticism of the Constitution was deeply affected by the ideological polarization which has acquired abnormal dimensions during the last five years. Although the moderate conciliatory values of Turkey's political culture seemed to remain dominant versus the two opposing antipodes represented by a militant Marxism and fundamentalism, the growing power of anti-system groups has undermined the foundations for any reasonable political consensus on democracy.

Looking back, Turkey's ideological polarization enjoyed at the beginning a rather promising start for the construction of a democratic pluralistic society. On the right, first a reconciliation of Islam and nationalism was sought. As pointed out previously, despite increased religiosity there was little realistic thinking about any new Islamic state. Pan-Turkism, a mixture of racialism, glorification of the past, exaltion of war, discrimination of non-Turkish groups, enjoyed also at the beginning only a very limited popularity. On the left, socialism which recorded its sentimentalist, universal phase before 1960 embraced later a rather moralist and rationalist attitude. Inhuman, exploitative aspects of capitalism were denounced. These relatively moderate trends were not abruptly changed after the entrance of the Turkish Labour Party (TIP) in 1965 in
parliament. The most relevant impact of the appearance of the TLP was the move to the left of the centre of the RPP, which in May 1972, resulted in İnönü’s defeat and resignation.

After the 1973 elections some Turkish political scientists, predicted that with further modernization, the urban poor would become more responsive to sectoral inducements and more inclined to engage in class-based political participation.\(^3\) This “critical re-alignment” has not proven to be the case especially after the by-election of 1979. The urban poor mostly appear to want practical social welfare more than the promises of total change forecast by new ideologies.

An important aspect of Turkey’s political stagnation derives from the fact that each general election produced an abnormal turnover of the legislative body, increased the “provincial” character of parliament, whereby DP’s were strongly entangled in a patron-client relationship in service of peripheral voters. The dominant parochial character of the last assemblies discouraged any politician in bringing national and international issues for debate except for demagogical purposes.

Obviously the most devastating effect on Turkish political life came from the proliferation of extremist political parties and armed illegal, guerilla groups, Within the party spectrum there were about six small leftist parties, none of them represented in parliament, as well as Moscow or Peking oriented student organizations. On the right, next to the two coalition parties, there were five semi-political associations, the largest with about 300,000 members, This organization had also its branches in Europe, mostly in Federal Germany.\(^3\) Escalating terrorism and anarchy finally rendered the intervention on the armed forces as the only desirable solution.

Summing up, the transformation of the Ottoman-Turkish state in the XIX th century did not result from the impulses co-

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ming from the civil society. There were no Ottoman estate, no hereditary nobility, no autonomous clergy, no bourgeoisie. The Tanzimat reform led principally to the modernization of the bureaucracy. The élite groups which played the leading role in the emergence of the modern Ottoman-Turkish state came within this bureaucracy.

The Kemalist movement, following the “Young Turk” regime, brought drastic changes into Turkish society. But it was not a social revolution, there was no insurrection in the cities or rural areas except resistance against foreign occupation. The war of liberation was a national struggle. The following “revolution from above” was not based on mass mobilization.

Kemalism constituted a continuum with the Tanzimat, Young Ottomans and Young Turks. One of the most important achievements of Mustafa Kemal in this state building process was his capacity to narrow the gap between the political centre and the periphery and to mobilize societal resources.

Legal issues played a decisive role in the location of the modern Turkish state. To the Kemalists, the vehicles of the revolution - very much in the spirit of voluntarism, were the state and the legal order. The nation was to be created through these instruments and the initial stimuli for economic development and the strengthening of the civil society were to come from the state.

The most relevant impact of the “ruralizing elections” of 1950 is not doubt the breakdown of a hiatus between the centre and the periphery. With the Democratic Party, political pressure coming from the rank and file of the party upon bureaucrats encouraged an administration responsive to peasants. While this process increased the proportion of provincial parliamentarians and led to the fulfillment of parochial demands, still this interaction represented for the periphery “political education in action”.

The continuing emotional and irrational style in Turkish politics produced especially after the revolution of 1960 an increasing polarization, which ultimately led to the weakening of institutional efficiency. Thus towards the end of the 70’s a partly alienated, apathetic and partly bewildered electorate
was anxiously watching the strife between the extreme right and left. Even then, empirical data reveal that the Turkish voters consider an operating legislative system as an undispen-sable or integral part of the Turkish democracy.

It is exactly this sincere insistence on making the people's voice heard, that obliges the armed forces to perform a double role: to be the guardian of national unity and of the rule of law, while preparing the ground for a constructive competition of political forces.

Did the modernization process of Turkey also lead to the adoption of genuine democratic values? I venture to say yes. The uninterrupted socio-economic and political struggle which has kept going for the last 200 years has produced besides the former leading strates of society, namely the bureaucracy and the army, new groups consisting of entrepreneurs, businessmen, technocrats, skilled and unionized workers at home and abroad, peasants. These new actors on Turkey's political scene, whether toiling in Anatolia or in the hearts of Europe or Saudi Arabia, are strongly attached to the values of human rights, popular representation and political participation. Surely, the essence of Turkey's civic society is not identical with other older democ-racies. That is why Turkey has still a long way to go. The fragile, so far rather unevenly developed civil society has to become more sturdy and the state, so omnipotent in Turkish history, will have to turn into a protective shell of this new type of pluralistic civil society. Yet these are not reasons for postponing the return to an open society. Looking ahead, we might say that when the future democratic state penetrates our lives less directly, a new form of cognition and consciousness will arise. Democratic maturity requires determination and patience. It also requires auto-criticism and a total commitment to the rules of the game, namely democracy as a way of living. Turkish history indicates that these qualities do exist in this country.